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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF CASE
This Court has jurisdiction over the above entitled
matter because it involves the interpretation of Rule 11
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Appellant brought an action in the District Court of
the Third Judicial District, Salt Lake County (the "State
case") against the Appellee claiming legal malpractice
was committed by the Appellee in handling a lawsuit for
the

Appellant

against

Chrysler

Motor

Corporation

("Chrysler" herein), a case filed in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah, Central Division
and assigned to Judge David Sam, (the "Federal case").
The Federal case was settled at the pretrial conference
and, thereafter, the Appellant refused to accept the
agreed upon settlement, dismissed Appellee as his counsel
and attempted to have the settlement agreement set aside.
Appellant's efforts were futile in that Judge Sam refused
to set the settlement aside, the 10th Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld Judge Sam's ruling and the United States
Supreme Court denied Appellant's Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari.
After discovery in the State case was complete,
Appellee filed a Motion for Summary Judgment which was
1

granted and the Trial Court, sua sponte, imposed Rule 11
sanctions upon Appellant and his attorney, jointly and
severally, in the sum of $3,684.40 representing the costs
and fees incurred by the Appellee in defending the claims
brought against him by the Appellant in the State case.
It is from the Order Granting Appellee's Motion for
Summary Judgment and the imposition of sanctions that the
Appellant appeals. (Shortly after the Notice of Appeal
was filed, Appellee and Appellant's attorney reached a
compromise and settlement agreement, therefore, that
matter is not before the Court.)
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Appellee contends that the Trial Court in the State
case properly granted his Motion for Summary Judgment and
imposed Rule 11 sanctions and submits that the issues
raised herein are:
1.

Do the doctrines of res judicata or estoppel

bar Appellant's claims in the State case?
2.

Was the sua sponte imposition of Rule 11

sanctions by the Trial Court in the State case an abuse
of discretion?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts material to the issues presented herein
2

are:
1.

In March of 1987, Appellant purchased a 1987

Dodge van from Hinckley Dodge of Salt Lake City, Utah
("Hinckley" herein) under a Retail Installment Contract.
He neither put money down on the van nor made any
payments under the contract. (R. 188 and 189)
2.

Appellant claimed that immediately after he

took possession of the van, he discovered that the
sliding door did not work properly and oil leaked from
the engine in significant quantities. (R. 10 at paragraph
10)
3.

Appellant

contended

that

he

made

several

demands on Hinckley to repair the van but Hinckley
refused even though it was still under a 12,000 mile
warranty. (R. 11 at paragraphs 11 & 12)
4.

Appellant took delivery of the van and returned

it to Hinckley 18 days later, after driving it 5,000
miles as a taxi. (R. 171)
5.

Appellant had no evidence to show Chrysler

carelessly and negligently manufactured the van but
claimed he sustained damages of $10,369, to wit: $80 for
installation of a taxi meter, $289 for installation of a
car phone and $10,000 for loss of business during the
3

year xys/. (R. 171)
6.

At a pretrial conference held in the Federal

case, the parties reached a settlement and, on the
record, counsel for Chrysler read the settlement terms to
Judge Sam and to the Appellant, who agreed that the
settlement terms as read were an accurate reflection of
the agreement reached by the parties. (R. 44 - 47)
7.

Judge Sam, who presided over the pretrial

settlement conference held in the Federal case, approved
the

settlement

after

questioning

the

Appellant

to

ascertain whether or not he understood and accepted its
terms. (A transcript of Judge Sam's inquiry is set forth
at R. 45 lines 16 thru 25)
8.

Thereafter, Appellant filed a Motion to Set

Aside the Settlement Agreement and therein claimed, among
other things, that Appellee committed malpractice and was
negligent in not properly prosecuting the Federal case by
neither seeking timely discovery nor filing affidavits in
opposition to Chrysler's motions, in spite of Appellant's
repeated demands and suggestions to do so. (R. 53 and 54)
9.

On

January

12,

1990,

Judge

Sam

denied

Appellant's Motion to Set Aside Settlement Agreement. (R.
50 - 56)
4

10.

In so ruling, Judge Sam stated, in part, that

"there is not a scintilla of evidence showing Niculescu
experienced coercion or anything more than settler's
remorse, the Court finds no reason to set aside what is
an extremely generous settlement considering Niculescu,
without paying Chrysler or Hinckley Dodge anything, but
putting 5,000 miles on a van in three weeks and he
offered only unsupported allegations concerning his claim
for lost profits."

Judge Sam further stated that the

only reason Rule 11 sanctions were not imposed against
Niculescu was because he appeared pro se. (R. 56)
11.

Thereafter, Appellant appealed the ruling of

Judge Sam to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals.
12.

On January 30, 1990, Appellant brought the

State case claiming that Appellee committed malpractice
(R. 5 Count I ) , was negligent

(R. 6 Count II) and

breached an implied covenant (R. 7 Count III) by not
properly prosecuting the Federal case.
13.

On June 20, 1990, the 10th Circuit Court of

Appeals confirmed Judge Sam's ruling. (R. 60)
14.

Thereafter, Appellant appealed the decision of

the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals to the United States
Supreme Court.
5

15.

On October 15, 1990, Appellant accepted $2,500

as full payment for the settlement in the Federal Case
and signed a General Release. (R. 62)
16.

On February 19, 1991, the United States Supreme

Court denied Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari
in the Federal Case. (R. 63)
17.

Appellant persisted with the claim brought

against the Appellee in the State case from January 1990
to May 1991.
18.

The Trial Court ruled that the State case

constituted a proceeding brought by the Appellant for the
specific purpose of harassing and causing needless delay
and increasing costs of litigation. (R. 166 paragraph 16)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
All

claims

made

by the

Appellant

against the

Appellee in the State case were made and ruled upon in
the Federal case and are final.
The imposition of Rule 11 sanctions by the Trial
Court was not an abuse of discretion in that the express
language of Rule 11 allows the Court to do what it did
i.e. upon its own motion, order the Appellant to pay
Appellee7s expenses incurred to defend the State case.

6

DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENTS
THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA OR ESTOPPEL BAR APPELLANT'S
CLAIMS.
As set forth in the summary of Appellee's argument,
all claims made by the Appellant against the Appellee in
the State case were made and ruled upon in the Federal
case and are final. The Federal case initially involved
Appellant's claims against Chrysler based on the alleged
failure by Chrysler to honor its new car warranty on the
1987 Dodge van purchased by Appellant from Hinckley.
That claim was settled at a pretrial conference held
before Judge Sam. Thereafter, the Appellant claimed that
he should not be bound by the Settlement Agreement
because
1.

The

Appellant

was

dissatisfied

with

the

Settlement Agreement after the fact;
2.

The settlement amount was not correct;

3.

Appellant entered into the agreement based upon

Appellee's
reached,

statement
Appellee

that

if an

would

agreement

withdraw

from

was not
further

representation of Appellant;
4.

Appellee did not seek timely discovery or file

affidavits in opposition to Chrysler's motions in spite
of Appellant's repeated demands and suggestions to do so;
7

and,
5.

The

written

Settlement

Agreement

inconsistent with the oral agreement made
because

it provided

was

in court

for the release of any claims

Appellant had against Hinckley, a non party.
These matters were considered by Judge Sam, who
refused to set aside the Settlement Agreement, the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, that upheld the ruling of Judge
Sam, and the Supreme Court of the United States, that
denied Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
After receiving Judge Sam's ruling, Appellant filed
the

State

action

against

Appellee.

Five

months

thereafter, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals confirmed
the ruling of Judge Sam and four months thereafter
Appellant accepted the settlement check from Chrysler and
signed a General Release but continued to pursue the
State case.

In February of 1991, the United States

Supreme Court denied Appellant's Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari but the Appellant continued to pursue the
State case.
In this factual setting, the Trial Court ruled that
the issues raised by the Appellant in the State case had
been previously raised and ruled upon in the Federal
8

case, that Judge Sam found the settlement in the Federal
case was made voluntarily by the Appellant, therefore,
the claims made by Appellant in the State case are barred
by the doctrine of res judicata.
Appellee contends that the rulings of the Trial
Court are correct because
1.

When Appellant settled his claims against

Chrysler in the Federal case, he compromised and settled
all claims he had against Chrysler and Hinckley arising
out of the sale of the van and waived any claim he had
against Appellee for the manner in which he handled the
federal case,
2.

When all of the courts in the Federal

system rejected Appellant7s attempt to set the Federal
case settlement aside for several reasons, one of which
was that Appellant's negligence, the doctrine of res
judicata or estoppel bar the the Appellant from raising
the same claims in the State case and
3.

It is consistent with decisions on this

subject rendered by Oregon in Sibold v. Sibold, 340 P.2d
974 (1959); by California in Bell v. Towne, 318 P.2d 110
(1958); by Nevada in Fitz Harris v. Phillips, 333 P.2d
721

(1958); by Colorado in Public Services Co, of
9

Colorado v. Osmase Wood Preserving. 813 P.2d 785 (1991)
and by Oklahoma in McKee v. Producers7 and Refiners'
Corp.. 170 Okl. 559, 41 P.2d 466, the Annotation at 88
A.L.R. 574 and 3 Okla. L. Rev. 104.
The only real question presented by the facts herein
is whether Appellant's claims are barred by the doctrine
of a res judicata or the doctrine of estoppel.
The doctrines of res judicata and estoppel are
thoroughly discussed in Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U.S.
351, 24 L. Ed. 195 (1897), the leading American case on
the point.

The following language of Mr. Justice Field

has done much to clear up confusion that exists on the
subject:
There is a difference between the
effect of a judgment as a bar or
estoppel against the prosecution of
a second action upon the same claim
or demand, and the effect as an
estoppel in another action between
the same parties upon a different
claim or case of action.
In the
former case, the judgment, if
rendered
upon
the
merits,
constitutes an absolute bare to a
subsequent action. It is a finality
as to the claim or demand in
controversy, concluding parties and
those in privity with them, not only
as to every matter which was offered
and received to sustain or defeat
the claim or demand, but as to any
other admissible matter which might
have been offered for that purpose.
10

* * * The language, therefore, which
is so often used, that a judgment
estops not only as to every ground
of recovery or defense actually
presented in the action, but also as
to every ground which might have
been presented, is strictly accurate
when applied to the demand or claim
in controversy.
Such demand or
claim, having passed into judgment,
cannot
again
be brought
into
litigation between the parties in
proceedings at law upon any ground
whatever.
But when the second
action between the same parties is
upon a different claim or demand,
the judgment in the prior action
operates as an estoppel only as to
those matters in issue or points
controverted, upon the determination
of which the finding or verdict was
rendered. In all cases, therefore,
where it is sought to apply the
estoppel of a judgment rendered upon
one cause of action, to matters
arising in a suit upon a different
cause of action, the inquiry must
always be as to the point or
question actually litigated and
determined in the original action,
not what might have been thus
litigated and determined.
The Restatement of the law states that where a
judgment

of a previously

tried

case is claimed to

preclude further litigation of the particular facts upon
which the Court made findings the following must exist:
Where causes of action are separate
and different, and there is no true
issue of res adjudicata involved, a
judgment in one case will not
operate as a bar of estoppel in
11

another, unless there has been a
finding of a specific fact in the
former
judgment,
that
was
controlling and material in that
case# and is also controlling and
material in the pending case. And,
for such a judgment to operate as a
bar of estoppel, it must also appear
that the matter of fact was so in
issue that it was necessarily
determined in the former case.
Restatement of the Law, Judgments,
Section 68.
Based upon this analysis, it appears that
Appellant's claims in the State case were barred by
estoppel.
THE SUA SPONTE IMPOSITION OF RULE 11 SANCTIONS BY THE
TRIAL COURT WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
The

Trial

Court

ruled

that

the

State

case

constituted a proceeding brought by Appellant interposed
for

the

specific

purpose

of

harassing

and

causing

needless delay and increasing the costs of litigation (R.
166 paragraph 16) and determined that it was reasonable
that sanctions be imposed against the Appellant for all
costs and fees incurred by the Appellee in the defense of
the State case. (R. 166 paragraph 17)
The ruling of the Trial Court is consistent with the
express language of Rule 11 which provides that the
signature of an attorney or a party constitutes a
12

certification by him that the pleading has been read and
is well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law
and not interposed for any improper purpose such as
harassment, unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
cost of litigation.

The Rule then goes on to state

If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is signed in violation of this
rule, the court, upon motion or upon
its own initiative, shall impose
upon the person who signed it, a
represented party, or both, an
appropriate sanction, which may
include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred because
of the filing of the pleading,
motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
The record clearly shows that the only reason Judge
Sam did not grant Rule 11 sanctions in the Federal case
is because Appellant was acting pro se when he filed his
Motion

to Set Aside the Settlement.

(R. 194 final

paragraph) In the face of this warning, Appellant filed
the State case to therein raise the same issues he
presented in the Federal case.
Under the foregoing circumstances, it is clear that
the Appellant failed to show that the Trial Court abused
it's discretion.

13

CONCLUSION
The ruling of the Trial Court is supported by the
record on appeal, the case law of many jurisdictions and
the Supreme Court and by Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure and, therefore, should ncjtbe disturbed.
Respedtf ujk^/submitted#

MAILING CERTIFK
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two
copies of the foregoing to Adrian Michail Niculescu, Pro
Se, 470 South 1300 East, #309, Salt Lake City, UT
this //r'day of May, 1992.
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ADDENDUM

JOSEPH N. NEMELKA JR. No. 5326
7001 South 900 East, Suite 210A
Midvale, Utah 84047
(801) 255-3979

Attorney for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ADRIAN NICULESCU,
Plaintiff,

C O M P L A I N T

civil NO.

^OO^OO^^QCKJ

-vsTHOMAS BLONQUIST,

'udge:

JUDGE P*T B. R ^ M

Defendant.
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, by and through counsel, and for
his causes of action against the Defendant hereby allege and
complain of said Defendant as follows:
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
PARTIES
1.

Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of

2.

Plaintiff is informed, believes, and therefore alleges

Utah.

that the defendant is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, is an attorney licensed to practice law in said State, and
that all acts complained of herein occurred in said county and
state.

000002

JURISDICTION & VENUE
3.

The amount in controversy is in excess of Ten Thousand

Dollars ($10,000.00) exclusive of costs,
4.

Jurisdiction and venue are proper with the above-

entitled Court per Utah Code Annotated §§ 78-3-4 and 78-13-7.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
5.

On or about July of 1987f the plaintiff and the

defendant entered into an attorney/client relationship for the
purpose of pursuing plaintiff's claims against Chrysler Motors
Corporation forf inter aliaf Chrysler's breach of warranty,
negligence, and breach of the warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose as they related to plaintiff's purchase of an
automobile from Hinckley Dodge in Salt Lake City, an authorized
dealer for said Chrysler Motors Corporation.
6.

The defendant accepted the sum of One Thousand Four

Hundred Fifty Dollars ($1,450) as a retainer for work to be done
in connection with the action against Chrysler and allegedly
entered into a contingency agreement with the plaintiff for an
additional 50% of the amount recovered.
7.

On or about the 1st day of September, 1987, the

defendant, on behalf of the plaintiff and in the representative
capacity as his attorney, filed a four (4) page Complaint in the
United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central
Division, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and
by this reference incorporated herein.

( 2 )

8.

In furtherance of the attorney/client relationship and

in connection with the action filed against Chrysler, the
defendant attended a pretrial scheduling conference on May 23,
1988, wherein it was agreed that discovery was to be completed
before November, 18, 1988 and that all interrogatories, requests,
and demands must be submitted timely to comply with said
completion date.
9.

Although Chrysler's attorney engaged in vigorous

discovery, plaintiff is informed, believes, and therefore alleges
that from the May 23 date to the November 18 date, the defendant
did absolutely nothing in the way of discovery on behalf of the
plaintiff, even though plaintiff had repeatedly informed the
defendant there were original documents that needed to be
obtained from Hinckley which were vital to this matter.
10.

On or about November 18, 1988, the last day by which

discovery was to be completed as given in the pretrial order, the
defendant allegedly submitted a First Request for Production of
Documents, First Set of Interrogatories, and First Request for
Admissions to Chrysler's attorney who thereafter filed a Motion
to Strike said discovery as not being timely filed.
11.

To the best of plaintiff's knowledge Chrysler's

motion was never heard and the matter went before the Court on a
settlement conference where the following acts of the defendant,
in addition to his failure to engage in any discovery prior to
the Court imposed deadline, were in further violation of the

( 3 )

attorney/client relationship which existed between the parties:
(a)

Defendant failed to properly advise the

plaintiff and failed to adequately explain and disclose the
material portions of the settlement agreement;
(b)

Defendant coerced the plaintiff into accepting

the settlement agreement by threatening to withdraw as his
attorney of record if he did not accept said settlement; and
(c)

The defendant included Chrysler's agentf

Hinckley/ in the dismissal with prejudice even though Hinckley
was not even a party to the law suit and even though the
defendant knew or ought to have known that Hinckley had ruined
plaintiff's credit and the settlement agreement precluded
plaintiff from legally pursuing a valid claim against Hinckley.
12.

Plaintiff is informed, believes, and therefore

alleges that the defendant, after his services were terminated
by the plaintiff, executed the above referenced settlement
agreement in direct contradiction to the instructions he had
received from the plaintiff.
COUNT I
MALPRACTICE
13.

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference

paragraphs 1 through 12 of this Complaint.
14.

The plaintiff relied on defendant's representations

that by holding himself for hire to the general public, the
defendant possessed the knowledge and skill common to members of

( 4 )

his profession and that the defendant would use the care and
diligence reasonably necessary to pursue the claim against
Chrysler.
15.

Plaintiff is informed, believes, and therefore

alleges that the defendant's actions complained of herein clearly
fall below any reasonable standards within the State of Utah.
WHEREFORE, under his First Cause of Action, plaintiff
prays for judgment against the defendant as follows:
1.

For General Damages in the sum of $247,500.00;

2.

For Compensatory Damages in the sum of $1,450.00;

3.

For reasonable attorney's fees for being required to

bring this action, for costs of court; and
4.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems

just and proper in the premises.
COUNT II
NEGLIGENCE
16.

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference

paragraphs 1 through 12 of this Complaint.
17.

In connection with the attorney/client relationship,

Defendant owed a duty to plaintiff to:
(a)

Reasonably and diligently pursue the law suit

against Chrysler;
(b)

To properly advise the plaintiff as to the

material aspects of the alleged settlement agreement;
(c)

To allow the plaintiff to make a voluntary and

( 5 )

000006

and uncoerced decision with respect to the settlement
agreement; and
(d) To insure that plaintiff's future legal rights
were protected.
18.

As heretofore alleged, defendant breached these

duties to the plaintiff and as a direct and proximate cause of
the defendant's actions, plaintiff has been damaged in that he
is now precluded from pursuing his claim against Chrysler, has
lost a significant amount of business, has suffered extreme
damage to his credit, and has suffered severe emotional distress.
WHEREFORE, under his Second Cause of Action Plaintiff
prays for judgment against the Defendant as follows:
1.

For General Damages in the sum of $247,500.00;

2.

For Compensatory Damages in an amount to be determined

at the time of trial in this matter but for not less $100,000.00;
3.

For reasonable attorney's fees, for costs of court,

and for such other and further relief as the Court may deem just
and proper in the premises.
COUNT III
BREACH OF IMPLIED COVENANT
19.

Plaintiff realleges and incorporates by reference

paragraphs 1 through 12 of this Complaint.
20.

Plaintiff is informed, believes, and therefore

alleges that in the attorney/client relationship previously
existing between the parties there existed an implied covenant

( 6 )

that the defendant would represent plaintiff's interests with
competence and diligence.
21.

Plaintiff is further informed and therefore alleges

that the defendant's conduct in connection with the law suit
against Chrysler was neither competent nor done with diligence.
22.

That as a direct and proximate result of the

defendant's breach of this implied covenant, plaintiff has been
damaged in that he is precluded from pursuing his claim against
Chrysler and Hinckley, has lost a significant amount of business,
has suffered extreme damage to his business, all of which has
caused the plaintiff severe emotional distress.
WHEREFORE, under his Third Cause of Action, Plaintiff
prays for judgment against the Defendant as follows:
1.

For General Damages in the sum of $247,500.00;

2.

For Compensatory Damages in an amount to be determined

at the time of trial in this matter but for not less than
$100,000.00;
3.

For Consequential Damages in an amount to be

determined at the time of trial;
4.

For reasonable attorney's fees, for costs of court,

and for such other and further relief as the Court may deem just
and proper in the premises.
DATED this

day of January, 1990.

JOSEPH N. NEMELKA JR.
Attorney for Plaintiff

'J0G908

EXHIBIT "A"

Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq., A0369
Attorney for Plaintiff
40 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 533-0525
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
)

ADRIAN NICULESCU,
Plaintiff,

>

-vsCHRYSLER MOTORS CORPORATION,
a Delaware corporation,
Defendant.

Plaintiff

complains

]
1
!
]

COMPLAINT
Civil No.

]

of

the

defendant

and

alleges as

follows:
COUNT I
1.

Plaintiff is a resident and a citizen of the state

of Utah and resides at Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County.
2.

Defendant is a corporation and is incorporated in

the state of Delaware with its principal place of business
in New York City, New York and is authorized to do business
in the State of Utah.
3.

The plaintiff claims jurisdiction of the above

court pursuant to 28 USC Section 1332(a)(1) based upon the
diversity

of citizenship that exists between the plaintiff

and the defendant.
4.

The

amount

in controversy

exceeds

the sum of

$10,000, exclusive of interest and costs.
5.

The plaintiff claims that the proper venue lies in

the above court pursuant to 28 USC Section 1391(a) in that
the matter arose in the Central Division of the above court
and the acts and conduct of the defendant were perpetrated
in said

division

and jurisdiction

and

that

the plaintiff

therein resides.
6.

During the month of March 1987, plaintiff obtained

from Hinkley

Dodge,

an authorized

dealer

in the state of

Utah for the defendant, a vehicle for use as a taxi.
7.

The vehicle that was purchased was a 1987 Dodge

B150VAN, VIN 2b4HBllTlHK215745 and at the time of purchase
defendant's

authorized

dealer was

told

and

therefore knew

that said van would be used by plaintiff as a taxi.
8.

After

purchasing

said vehicle plaintiff utilized

the same as a taxi cab in Salt Lake County, state of Utah.
9.

Said vehicle was manufactured by the defendant and

transported to the state of Utah for sale.
10.

Immediately after plaintiff's purchase of the said

vehicle the door used to admit passengers would not function
properly and the vehicle's engine leaked oil in significant
amounts.

11.

Plaintiff

returned

the vehicle

to defendant's

authorized dealer in the state of Utah on a number of occasions and in each instance requested that the needed repairs
be made and was informed that the door could not be fixed
and the oil leak could be cured by putting an additive in
the motor oil.
12.

There

was

on

the

part

of

the

defendant's

authorized dealer a complete failure to attempt repairs even
though

the vehicle was

under warranty

i.e. it had been

driven less than 12,000 miles and had been purchased within
twelve (12) months.
13.

Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff avers that the

vehicle was not fit for its intended purpose and as a result
that he was unable to use the vehicle for a taxi resulting
in financial loss to his business in the sum of $250,000.
COUNT II
14.

Plaintiff

repeats, realleges and incorporates by

reference hereat paragraphs 1 through 11 of plaintiff's
complaint.
15.

Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff alleges that

defendant failed to abide by its written warranty and as a
result thereof the defendant has been damaged in the sum of
$250,000.

COUNT III
16.

Plaintiff repeats, realleges and incorporates by

reference hereat paragraphs 1 through 11 of plaintiff's
complaint.
17.

Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff alleges that

said vehicle was carelessly and negligently manufactured by
defendant.
18.

As a direct, proximate and legal result of the

negligence of the defendant, plaintiff has been damaged in
the sum of $250,000.
WHEREFORE,

plaintiff

demands

judgment

against

the

defendant in the sum of $250,000 together with his costs incurred herein and such other and further relief as the court
deems just in the premises.
Dated this

j/ ~ day of August, 1987.

N

Thomas, JR. Bltmquist
Plaintiff's Address:
P.O. Box 2557
S.L. C , Utah 84110
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^Huty Clerk
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Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq., (0369
Pro Se
40 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 533-0525

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
]|

ADRIAN NICULESCU
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT
and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

;

v.

]|

THOMAS BLONQUIST,

]
]I

Defendant.

Case No. 900900580

Judge Pat B. Brian

The Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for
hearing before the above entitled court at 8:30 a.m. on Monday, the
29th day of April, 1991.

Plaintiff was present with his attorney

of record, Joseph M. Nemelka, Jr., and the Defendant was present,
pro se.

The Court heard and considered the statements and

arguments of counsel, read the pleadings in support of and in
opposition

to the Motion

considered

all

of

the

for Summary Judgment and read and

other

pleadings

on

file

herein

and,

thereupon, took the matter under advisement.
Court was reconvened on Friday the 3rd day of May, 1991 at
8:30 a.m. and the Court indicated that after having taken the
matter under advisement and thoroughly reviewing all material
submitted by the parties and duly considering the same, he was

prepared to make and enter the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff is an attorney at law.

2.

The Plaintiff participated in a five hour settlement

conference in the United States District Court for the District of
Utah on January 13, 1989 in the case of Adrian Niculescu v.
Chrysler Motor Company, No 87C0770S, the "Federal case" herein.
3.

Plaintiff

was

represented

in

the

Federal

case

by

Defendant above named, Thomas R. Blonquist, who is a member in good
standing of the Utah State Bar.
4.

Plaintiff freely, knowingly and intelligently entered

into and signed a settlement agreement in the Federal case as a
result of the said five hour settlement conference.
5.

On January 30, 1990, Plaintiff brought the above entitled

action against the Defendant for legal malpractice.
6.

On October 15, 1990, Plaintiff accepted $2,500 as full

payment for the settlement in the Federal case and signed a General
Release. See Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
7.

On January 12, 1990, Judge David Sam, the judge presiding

over the Federal case, denied Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside the
Settlement Agreement.
8.

See Exhibit "B" attached hereto.

In so ruling, Judge Sam stated in part that "there is not

a scintilla of evidence showing Plaintiff Niculescu experienced
2

coercion or anything more that settler's remorse in what was an
extremely generous settlement, wherein Plaintiff put 5,000 miles on
a van purchased from Hinckley Dodge, without paying one dollar for
said van."

Judge Sam stated further, "The only reason Rule 11

sanctions were not imposed against Niculescu is because he was
appearing pro se."
9.

Thereafter, Plaintiff appealed the ruling of Judge Sam to

the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
10.

On June 20, 1990 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals

affirmed the ruling of Judge Sam. See Exhibit "C" attached hereto.
11.

Thereafter, Plaintiff appealed the decision of the Tenth

Circuit Court of Appeals to the United States Supreme Court.
12.

On February 19, 1991, the United States Supreme Court

denied Plaintiff's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari. See Exhibit
11

D" attached hereto.
13.

Plaintiff has persisted with the claims brought against

the Defendant in the above entitled matter from July 1990 to May
1991.
14.

The Court, sua sponte, finds as follows:

a.

Counsel for the Plaintiff has violated Rule 11 of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in that the signature of an attorney
constitutes a certification by him that he has read the pleading,
motion or other paper, that, to the best of his knowledge,
3

information and belief formed, after reasonable inquiry, that it is
well founded in fact and warranted by existing law.
b.

The above entitled

action brought by the Plaintiff

against the Defendant violates the provisions of Rule 11.
c.

The

above

entitled

matter

constitutes

a proceeding

brought by the Plaintiff interposed for the specific purpose of
harassing and causing needless delay and increasing in the costs of
litigation.
d.

It is reasonable that sanctions be imposed against

Plaintiff's counsel and the Plaintiff, jointly and severally, for
all costs and fees incurred by the Defendant in the defense of the
above entitled action.
e.

It is reasonable that the Defendant submit an affidavit

setting forth all costs and fees incurred in the defense of this
matter.
f.

It is reasonable that the Plaintiff and his attorney,

jointly and severally, be required to pay said fees and costs in
full on or before June 1, 1991.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and
enters the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The decisions of the United States District Court for the

District of Utah, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United
4

States Supreme Court are the final dispositive law of the case and
their decisions are res judicata in the above entitled matter.
2.

There are no genuine issues of material fact in the above

entitled case and Defendant is entitled to Summary Judgment as a
matter of law.
3.

Good cause exist for Plaintiffs counsel to be sanctioned

for violating Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and for
the Plaintiff and his attorney, jointly and severally, to be
ordered to pay all costs and fees incurred by the Defendant in the
defense of the above entitled action.
DATED this

I *7 day of June, 1991.
BY THE COURQ

V

_

Pat B. Brian
Judge
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to: Joseph N. Nemelka, Jr., Attorney
at Law, 7001 South 900 East, Suite 210 A, Midvale, UT
-ft ^ day of June, 1991.
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EXHIBIT "A"

mroT8R

dZfezi* ft? £/of*7$
GENERAL RELEASE
In consideration for the payment of Two Thousand Five Hundred
and No/100 Dollars ($2,500.00) payable to Adrian Niculescu, receipt
of

which

is

acknowledged

"undersigned") ,
discharges
Inc.,

the

by

undersigned

Chrysler Motors

their

predecessors

Adrian

hereby

(hereinafter

releases

and

the

forever

Corporation, Inc. and Hinckley Dodge,

agents, principals,
in

Niculescu

servants, employees, affiliates,

interest, successors

in interest, subsidiary and

parent corporations (hereinafter referred to as "released parties"),
from any and all claims, losses, demands, damages, actions, causes
of action, or suits of whatever kind or nature which now exist or
which may hereafter accrue, because of, for, arising out of, or in
any

way

connected

with

the

purchase,

use,

condition,

repairs,

merchantability or warranties of a 1987 Dodge B150 Van, Serial No.
2B4HB11T1HK215745,

the details of which are more fully set forth in

the files and records of the United States District Court for the
District of Utah, Central Division, in that certain action entitled,
Adrian

Niculescu

v.

Chrysler Motors Corporation

Civil No. 87C-

0770S.
This is a general and complete release of all claims against
the released parties and includes, but is not limited to, claims for
personal

injuries, property

contribution,

breach

of

damage,

contract,

claims

emotional

for

loss

distress,

of

income,

indemnity,

attorney's fees, permanent injury, costs of litigation and all other
claims of any kind or character.

It is also the express intent of

0

the undersigned to this general release to relieve the released
parties of any and all liability for indemnity, contribution or for
attorney's fees arising from or pertaining to the incident abovedescribed.
It is further understood and agreed that this settlement is
the compromise of a doubtful and disputed claim and that payment is
not to be construed as an admission of liability on the part of the
released

parties, by whom

undersigned

liability

is expressly denied.

represents and warrants that in entering

The

into this

release that he has had the opportunity for independent legal advice
and is not relying upon any claims, representations pr advices from
any representative of any party hereby released.

-j&kj^^-

(W.

ADRIAN NICULESCU

STATE OF UTAH

oJMS ; ao
y-An

)
) ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

/r«

day of -rJanuerry"; T9B9^f p e r s o n a l l y appeared
On t h e
befor^jnae Adrj.an^^N^culescu, t h e s i g n e r of t h e foregoing g e n e r a l
e]?5g^
t o me t h a t he executed t h e same,

r

i^SS^&W

ROBERT KUUtDEH
8aftUk«Clty, Utah 84101
My Comrolwton E*pta*
May 16,1993
State of Utah

•
J
I
|
I

My Commission E x p i r e s :

H

/^ /<?<?!

NOT/IKi PUBLIC in and for the
State of Utah, residing at
~7

/<^o

JCAU, J<£. ?£
-2-
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EXHIBIT "B"

^K*0t88-

90,-Myi-
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THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT^FtfR THE DISTpiCT^OF UTAH
TmiliC

CENTRAL DIVISION
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

P

-

^

tlf\f} 9/*K)ft'j* * * *

ADRIAN NICULE5CU,

^^^UHOBLiEi
Plaintiff,
R U L I N G

vs.
CHRYSLER MOTORS CORPORATION,
a Delaware corporation,
Defendant,

Case No. 87-C-0770-S

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

This

action

is

before

the

court

on

plaintiff

Niculescu's motion to set aside settlement agreement
motions of defendant Chrysler Motors Corporation

Adrian
and the

(Chrysler) to

enforce settlement agreement and for Fed. R. Civ, P, 11 sanctions,

1.

Facts

On March 11, 1987 plaintiff Niculescu purchased a 1907 van
from Hinckley Dodge, Inc. (Hinckley) under a Retail Installment
Contract and took possession of it two days later.
purchased the van

Hinckley

(for use as a taxi cab) from Lay ton Hills

Chrysler-Plymouth-Dodge.

Niculescu neither put any money down on

the van nor paid anything for its purchase or delivery.

He alleges

that immediately after he took possession of the van, he discovered
the

door

did

quantities • "

not

work

and

the

oil

leaked

in

^significant

Niculescu further alleges he made several demands on

Hinckley to repair the van (Hinckley says it first heard from him
on March 25 or 26) but Hinckley refused even though the van was
still under a 12,000 mile warranty.

On March 31, 1987, only 18

days after taking the van (during which timejie used it as a taxi),
Niculescu returned the van to Hinckley with 5,000 miles on it.
Niculescu, a full-time taxi driver since 1983, bought the van only
after

he

prices,

shopped
interest

extensively
rates

and

at

other

features.

dealerships,
He

admitted

comparing
he

had

no

evidence to show Chrysler carelessly and negligently manufactured
the van; however, he claimed his damages were $10,369.00: $80.00
for installation of the taxi meter; $289 for installation of a car
phone; and $10,000 for loss of business during 1987.

The parties settled the action.

On the record, counsel for

Chrysler read the settlement agreement and Niculescu as well as his
counsel, Tom Blonquist, agreed it accurately reflected the result
of the settlement negotiations.
MR.
WALDBILLING
(Counsel
lor Chrysler):
The
settlement that has been reached is that Chrysler Motor
Corporation will pay Adrian Niculescu by check made
2
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payable to him and his counsel, Tom Blonquist, in the
amount of $2500 in return for a full and general release
of Chrysler Motor Corporation, Hinckley Dodge and all of
their agents and employees, predecessor corporation, et
cetera, from any and all claims, causes of action or
anything else arising from the plaintiff's purchase, use
or anything else arising from his possession of the 1987
Dodge B 110 van.

And the case will be dismissed with prejudice and
on the merits.
Tr. 3.

The following colloquy then ensued:
THE COURT: That is correct, Mr- Bloomquist [sic]?

MR. BLOOMQUIST: Even though Hinckley is not a party
to this lawsuit, Your Honor.

MR. BLOOMQUIST: It is our understanding that this
settlement will be inclusive of Hinkley [sic], correct?
MR. NICULESCU: Yes.
Id.

The court approved the settlement after questioning lliculoscu

to ascertain he understood and accepted the terms of the agreement.
Id. at 3-4.

Blonquist later signed the General Release and Stipulation of
Dismissal

and

sent

it

to

Chrysler

in

exchange

for

a

check.

Chrysler requested Mark Besendorfer, Niculescu's new counsel, to
complete'the settlement agreement, but Niculescu refused to sign
it. saying the terms (identical to those read into the record) were
3
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broader than those to which he agreed.

Niculescu prepared his own

"Release" that differs from the settlement agreement only in scope:
he

expressly seeks to (1) limit his release to the breach of the

warranty

and

merchantability

claims

against

Chrysler

and

(2)

reserve his claims against
any individuals and entities, agents, principals,
servants, subsidiary or parent corporation including, but
not limited to, claims he may have for damage to his
credit occasioned
by Chrysler Credit Corporation,
Hinckley Dodge, Inc., or any other parties whether or not
now known to [him] and all consequent damages, lost
income, attorney's fees or other damages which may have
occurred or may occur in the future and all other claims
of any kind or character.
Niculescu's Release dated July 28, 1988.
release

as

being

contrary

to

the

Chrysler rejects the

settlement

and

completely

unacceptable.

In his motion to set aside the settlement agreement Niculescu
claims

(1)

he

told

Blonquist

he

was

dissatisfied

with

the

settlement agreement almost immediately after it was reached and
communicated his dissatisfaction to him several times in letters;
(2) the settlement amount was not correct because the copy of a
Hinckley service invoice attached to Niculescu f s deposition was not
a true and correct copy of the original document and the difference
between the original document and the purported copy was material
to Niculescufs claim;

(3) Niculescu entered

4

into

the agreement

000191

partiiy as a result: or tJionquist' s statement that if an agreement
was not reached, Blonquist would withdraw from further representation on behalf of Hiculescu; (4) Blonquist did not seek timely
discovery or file affidavits in opposition to Chrysler's motions
in spite of Hiculescufs repeated demands and suggestions to do so;
and (5) the proposed settlement agreement is inconsistent with the
oral agreement in court because it provides for a release of all
claims Hiculescu may have against Hinckley, where that was not
agreed to and where Hinckley v/as not a party to the action.

Chrysler argues the settlement agreement should be enforced
because (1) the settlement was agreed to on the record; (2) the
court approved the settlement; and (3) counsel for both parties
signed the General Release and Stipulation of Dismissal. Chrysler
further argues it is entitled to attorneys1 fees and costs under
Rule 11, because Hiculescu1s motion to set aside the agreement has
Ho basis in law or fact.

II.

Discussion

The test for determining whether a party has a right to
challenge a settlement agreement is "voluntariness.11
should

examine all

factors surrounding
5

The court

the acceptance of the
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settlement

agreement

to

determine

whether

voluntarily or was a result of coercion.
Bible, 798

F.2d

474

(Em. App.

1986);

it

was

entered

Trans-Sterling, Inc. v.
Willard

v.

City

of

Los

Angeles, 803 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1986).

Here, the sole significant difference between the original
settlement agreement and Niculescu 1 s Release is that the original
dismissed with prejudice all claims against^Chrysler, Hinckley "and
all of their agents and employees, predecessor corporation, et
cetera11 while Niculescu f s Release would preserve those very claims.
Clearly

Niculescu 1 s

settlement

Release

agreement.

directly

Blonquist

contradicts

specifically

parties1

the

told

the

court

Niculescu agreed to release the claims against Hinckley Dodge, even
though Hinckley was not a party to the suit, and Niculescu affirmed
not

only

that

statement,

but

Chrysler's

explanation

of

the

settlement agreement.

Because there is not a scintilla of evidence showing Niculescu
experienced coercion

or anything more than settler's remorse, the

court finds no reason to set aside what is an extremely generous

The court rejects as unsubstantiated and
insufficient
Niculescu1s assertion he agreed to the settlement only under threat
Blonquist wouLd withdraw as counsel.
6
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settlement

considering

Niculescu, without

paying

Chrysler

or

Hinckley Dodge anything, put 5,000 miles on the van in three weeks
and he offered only unsupported allegations concerning his claim
for lost profits.

Moreover, the court agrees with Chrysler that

the nearly unlimited language concerning potential claims against
Chrysler affiliates violates the core of the settlement agreement
to which Niculescu gave his unqualified assent in open court.

Accordingly, the court denies Niculescufs motion to set aside
and'grants Chrysler's motion to enforce the settlement agreement.
Because Niculescu was acting pro se when he filed his motion to set
aside, the court will not grant Rule 11 sanctions.

DATED this

/X K

day of

., 192t£.
BY THE COURT:

counsel: l/16/90sm
k A. Besendorfer
nor M. Waldbillig, Esq.

DAVID SAM
U.S. District Judge
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EXHIBIT "C"

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

JUfl2 0l!?90

TENTH CIRCUIT

.OBERT L HOECKER
Clerk

ADRIAN NICULESCU,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
CHRYSLER MOTORS CORPORATION,
a Delaware corporation,

No. 90-4018
(D.C. No. 87-C-770S)
(D. Utah)

Defendant-Appellee.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK and EBEL, Circuit Judges. **

Plaintiff-appellant, Adrian Niculescu, appeals from the
district court's denial of his motion to set aside a settlement
agreement with defendant-appellee, Chrysler Motors.

Although

Miculescu agreed to the settlement in open court, he nov; proffers
a bevy of reasons whv hp should not be held to his bargain, none
of which are convincing.

Chrysler's counsel read the settlement

agreement into the record.

Appellee's Brief Addendum D, at 2-3.

This order and judgment has no precedential value and shall
not be cited, or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit,
except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of ttie law of
the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir. R.
36.3.
/;*

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel
lias determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially
assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P.
34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause therefore is ordered
submitted without oral argument.
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The court then asked Niculescu whether he understood the
settlement and accepted it.

Niculescu answered affirmatively:

THE COURT: Mr, Niculescu, let me just ask you three
questions. One, did you hear what counsel has stated
regarding this settlement?
MR. NICULESCU:

Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And did you understand what you will receive
as a settlement?
MR. NICULESCU: Yes.
THE COURT:

Do you accept that as the settlement?

MR. NICULESCU: Yes.
THE COURT:
the Court.
Id. at 3-4.

Very well.

The settlement'* is approved by

Because we find no basis in the record for setting

aside the settlement agreement between Niculescu and Chrysler
Motors, we affirm the judgment of the district court substantially
for the reasons stated in its order of January 12, 1990, a copy of
which is attached hereto.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court

obby R. Baldock
ircuit Judge

000196
-2--

EXHIBIT "D"

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
WASHINGTON, D. C. 2 0 5 4 3

ebruary 19, 1991

Mr. Gainer M. Waldblllig
Clark Learning Bdlg., Ste. 510
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

Re:

Adrian Niculescu
v. Chrysler Motors Corporation
No.
90-6399

Dear Mr. Waldblllig:

The Court today entered the following order in the a
entitled case:
The petition for a writ of certiorari

is denied.

Very truly yours,

Uilliam K. Suter, Clerk
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iyili;IS|ilJ
JUN 1 9mn|
Thomas R. Blonquist, Esq., (0369
Pro Se
40 South f><"••!; i:a'itSalt Lake ^.sty, Utah 84102
Telephone
srn1 533-0525

n{*p«svC!«r;;
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)ISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JUDGMENT

L

-.V"i

P] ai nti f f,
Case Ho. 900900580

v.
THOMAS BLOW

Judge P?

Defendant.
Having h e r e t o f o r e e n t e r e d
Law a n d O i d e
an

sanations

imposed

before

.Tunc

t r , r * : - d i r i s ->f r , ; c t , C o n c l i i s l o i is o f

<:r-m» . :•» M o l i o n

Sanctions

^n

\ ^\

summary

Judgmei.*
f

vi(b(1:

•'n* --i-r.-

I , 1091 at: o r d e r e d

•'

v/*.>.>

*nd

Imposing

:.. 1

;>•.,>

1hat

p a i d on

a n d qoo»* -M-u.ce a p p e a r i n g

IT I S HEREBY ORDERED, AiVJHi)GEt) Mi

^T*-i

ii

$.1,684.40

Nfemelkn ,
wil.h

said

v Zj'

J

,

Mini I n

annum f r o m t h e d a t e
PATEP l-.his

i<

nf
'

this

day o f

toint-]y
IHMI

and

- - "

- f f-i H Lint

-overal'

unl iJ

and

SUM

intuit

judgment

or

therefor

be and h e i s h e r e b y a w a r d e d J u d g m e n t a g a i n r . t A d r i a n l i i c u j e s c u
iTn^oph

the

?

Of

|IMI"

paid,

Juno, 1091.

BY', THE COURT

7

~~P

-<O^L

Ldi^r- 7

Pat B. Brian
Judge

fV

.« «
> i H,
l

-v—

MAILING CERTIFICATE

correct

copy C « - — o i n , Motion .or Kntry C
~ t ,
correct: copy
Attorney at Law,
4- 4-^. Tnqech N. Nemelka, Jr., Atx.uj.ucj
Affidavit and Judgment to. Josepn N
„-,*,,*, io TTT 84047 and Adrian
. ,
470 South 1300 East *309, Salt LaKe City.
pro se
Niculescu, Pro se, <*/u
84102, this i h day of June, 1991.
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